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Individual evaluation interviews have become a widespread practice. 52% of employees in French
manufacturing firms over 50 employees declared an annual individual evaluation interview in 1997.
However whereas the problem of constructing an optimal contract with subjective evaluation (which
is defined simply as a signal in most papers) receives a large attention, firm-level evaluation interviews
are strikingly left aside from economic analysis. This paper aims at identifying the underlying logics
of individual evaluation interviews in the case of individual production and of team production. Especially,
it aims at analyzing the relationships between effort, wage distribution within the firms and individual
evaluation interviews. From a theoretical standpoint, three papers by Alchian and Demsetz (1972),
by Che and Yoo (2001) and by MacLeod (2003) are closely related to our paper and from an empirical
point of view, a paper by Engellandt and Riphahn (2004). Our theoretical analysis allows to derive
testable predictions regarding the effect of individual evaluation interviews on productive and cognitive
effort, on work overload and on wage setting. Using a matched employer / employee survey on computerisation
and organisational change (COI), we are able to test part of these predictions and to corroborate them.
First, evaluation interviews have a positive impact on productive and cognitive effort. Second, evaluation
interviews increase effort through two effects: the classical incentive effect and also a selection effect.
Third, the selection effect is stronger in the case of individual production compared with the case of
team production. Fourth, evaluated employees earn more than employees in a classical incentive scheme
and fifth, evaluated workers have a better knowledge of the rules driving wage setting.
Marc-Arthur Diaye
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"If the economic organization meters poorly, with rewards and production only loosely 
correlated, then productivity will be smaller; but if the economic organization meters well 
productivity will be greater."  






A main contribution of linked longitudinal employer / employee data is to provide a 
decomposition of wage rates into components due to individual heterogeneity and to firm 
heterogeneity. In France, Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) show that the person effect and 
firm effect account respectively for 70% and 20% of the variation of wages. The person effect 
component is bigger in France than in the US where it represents half of the wage variation.  
This indicates that the devices used by firms to attract and / or select workers with specific 
characteristics play a central role in determining the firm's wage structure. However, these 
devices have not been investigated thoroughly by economic analysis. In this paper, we are going 
to assess individual evaluation interview, an HRM practice that could contribute to the two goals 
of selecting workers and stimulating their effort. In France, 52% of employees with more than 
one year of seniority in manufacturing had been evaluated at least once in 1997. At that time, 
evaluation interviews were not regulated at the national or at the industry level. 
As an HRM practice, the function of evaluation interviews is not clear cut. Sometimes viewed as 
formal performance appraisal systems, evaluation interviews often use complex evaluation grids 
referring to loosely defined behavioural characteristics as well as to precisely defined goals and 
measured criteria. 
To assess evaluation interviews, it is useful to analyse them theoretically and to investigate 
empirically how they are implemented within firms. 
Intuitively, individual evaluation interviews are used to assess performance once the employee 
has undertaken her or his task. We will use here the term of ex post evaluation interviews. But, if 
we refer to a classic wage setting mechanism, there is no need for evaluation. The incentive 
wages drives the employee towards the level of effort that is optimal for the employer. In section 
2, we are going to propose a theoretical framework where ex post evaluation interviews insure 
risk adverse agent against technological or market uncertainty.  
In the French context, Crifo et al. (2004) observe that evaluation interviews are significantly 
more frequent when the employee is involved in collective work. The model of ex post evaluation 
interview is limited to give account of the function of evaluation interviews when employees 
work in teams, because individual  performance appraisal become difficult when the output 
cannot be separated between the members of a team (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). We are going 
to propose a model of ex ante individual evaluation interviews specific to the teamwork context, 
where evaluation comes first, before the constitution of teams and aims at fostering a team spirit. 
We conclude our theoretical approach by establishing some predictions about drivers and 
outcomes of individual evaluation interviews. 
We assess empirically part of these predictions in section 3. Our empirical investigation rests on 
a matched employer / employee survey on organisational change and ICT use (COI). In the   3
labour force section of the survey, employees are asked whether they have been interviewed 
individually at least once in 1997. They also give information on work organisation, on personal 
characteristics and on outcomes. The business section of the survey gives a detailed set of firm 
level characteristics reflecting technological and organisational choices implemented in French 
manufacturing at the end of the 1990s. We use a propensity score methodology to evaluate the 
causal effect of individual evaluation interviews on effort, work overload and wage setting. In a 
last section, we conclude. 
 
 
2.  A theoretical analysis of evaluation interview 
 
 
2.1.  Definition of Evaluation Interview 
 
Let us consider a Principal-Agent framework and let us define what an individual evaluation 
interview is. The theoretical determination of the optimal evaluation interview is a problem of its 
own that we are not going to solve in this paper. This would imply a rigorous assessment of the 
optimal
1 set of evaluation criteria. But we are going to leave this problem aside by simply 
assuming that the Principal determines (seeking advice from the Agent) a finite set  S   of criteria 
(characteristics) that he considers important for estimating the Agent's effort. Let us call  
s s v Ξ ∈   
the true level of agent's criterion  s  ( 1 = s   to  S ). We will assume that it is a private information 
namely that  vs  is a random variable which realisation is only observed by the Agent (ie. The 
Principal does not observe it). According to the revelation principle we can restrict ourselves to 
the following direct mechanism   ) ; ( g
s s Ξ = Σ   where  g is a result function,  
 
s s g Ξ → Ξ :  
 
) (
s s v g v a  
 
We call individual evaluation interview, the mechanism   ) ; ,... ,..., (
1 a
S s Σ Σ Σ = Σ   where the  
s Σ   ( 
S s ,... 1 =  ) are direct mechanisms and  a  is an aggregation function of marks resulting from the 
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Where  M   is a marks set.  
                                                 
1. In the sense that it minimizes the evaluation error. 
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This definition calls to two remarks. First in order to construct his own evaluation of the Agent's 
performance, the Principal may use the Agent's self-evaluations. Second, we assume the bounded 
rationality of the Principal, generating potential errors in his evaluation of the Agent's level of 
effort. Concerning this latter point, an interesting question from our point of view is to know 
whether it is theoretically possible to construct an incentive mechanism with individual 
evaluation interview when the Principal makes mistakes in his evaluation of the Agent's level of 
effort. Nonetheless in order to simplify we will assume that the probability of evaluation error is 
fixed and is common knowledge. To complete our comment, let us remark that since the purpose 
of the evaluation interview is to get a subjective evaluation of effort, then the Principal can 
directly take   Θ = M  (see the definition below). 
 
Let us now explain our formal analysis concerning the role of individual evaluation interview
2. 
Since we want to take into account the production technology, we are going to divide our analysis 
into two parts. Firstly, we will analyse the function of individual evaluation interview in a 
productive context where work is "individualised", that is designed in such a way that tasks are 
not shared between employees. And secondly, we will analyse the function of individual 
evaluation interview in a productive context where work is organised in teams (i.e. when the 




2.2. The Role of Evaluation Interview in Individual Production 
 
Concerning individual production, our theoretical framework is based on a Principal-Agent 
model with subjective evaluation of effort through an individual interview
3. We consider a 
Principal-Agent framework à la Che and Yoo (2001) in which production requires only one task. 
This task is performed by the Agent who makes an effort decision unobservable by the Principal. 
Production, that is the outcome of the task, is a random variable X  that can either succeed 
( 1 = X ) or fail ( 0 = X ) giving respectively R or 0 payoffs to the Principal. The Agent's 
individual effort denoted  K   (K   is a random variable from the Principal's stand point) belongs 
to the set   } 2 , 1 , 0 { = Θ   which is the set of legally possible levels of effort. In other words, the 
maximal level of effort that the Principal can legally incite the agent to supply is 2 = K . However 
the general set of levels of effort is  } ..., 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 { m g = Θ . Let  k q k K X = = = ) | 1 Pr(  and 
k q k K X − = = = 1 ) | 0 Pr(  respectively the conditional probability of success of the task given the 
Agent's level of effort  k  , and the conditional probability of failure of the task given the Agent's 
level of effort  k  . We will suppose that the Principal is risk-neutral, with a linear utility function  
                                                 
2. For more details, see Diaye et al. 2006. 
 
3. Our model can therefore be considered as a sub-model of the one of MacLeod (2003) but not completely for four reasons. First 
in our analysis, the individual evaluation interview is based upon some precise common knowledge criteria (which are accepted 
by both parties -Principal and Agent). Second we assume that the Principal's subjective evaluation of the Agent's effort takes into 
account the Agent's self-reports on a set of criteria. Third the production technology matters. Finally, we do not address the 
question of the strategy-proofness or the Nash-implementability of the individual interview mechanism. 
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r r b = ) (   and that the Agent is risk-averse with a utility function   ) ( ) ( ) , ( k v r u k r U − =   where  u   
is an increasing and concave function such that:   0 ) 0 ( = u ,   0 ) ( ≥ r u   0 ≥ ∀r ; and the Agent's 
disutility function of effort  k e k v × = ) (   where the unit of effort noted  e  is strictly positive. 
Moreover the Agent's reservation utility is equal to zero. Finally we assume
4 that   
0 1 0 1 2 ≥ > > > q q q   and that   2 1 2 q q ≥   (which guarantees that the participation constraint is 
fulfilled).The relationship between effort and production is an important feature of the production 
technology. As usual in the literature, we will consider two alternatives: production is either 
super-modular ( 0 1 1 2 q q q q − ≥ − ) or sub-modular ( 0 1 1 2 q q q q − ≤ − ). Broadly speaking when 
production is super-modular (respectively sub-modular), the return on effort is increasing 
(respectively decreasing) in the level of effort.  
 
It is straightforward to see (and this is well known in the literature) that for each level of effort we 
have the following incentive wages:  
 
 
    0 0 =
∗ w     
Sub-modularity:    )) /( ( 0 1
1
1 q q e u w − =
− ∗
   )) /( ( 1 2
1
2 q q e u w − =




  indeterminate    )) /( 2 ( 0 2
1
2 q q e u w − =
− ∗   
 
 
When the production technology is super-modular the Principal will implement the mechanism 
(
∗
2 w  ,   2 = k  ), which is designed in such a way that the Agent plays the maximal level of effort. 







2 )) /( ( )) /( (
q q
q q e u q q q e u q R −
− − −
− −
≤ ,  then the Principal will ask for the level of effort   1 = k . Otherwise, 
he will ask for a level of effort    2 = k .  
 
Hence in the classical mechanism, there is no need for the Principal to evaluate ex post the 
Agent's level of effort. So what is the role of individual evaluation interviews in the individual 
production? In order to understand our explanation, let us stress out two characteristics of the 
classical incentive mechanism (without individual evaluation interviews). The first one is that the 
Agent's wage will not directly depend on the level of effort, but instead on the success or the 
failure of the production. Of course, even if the Agent provides the maximal level of effort, the 
success of the production is not guaranteed. The second characteristic of classical incentive 
schemes is that if the Principal can choose between a sub-modular and a super-modular 
technology, he will always choose a super-modular one. The reasons are on the one hand because 
the Agent's wage   )) /( 2 ( 0 2
1 q q e u −
−   is lower than in the sub-modular technology case, and on 
the other hand because the probability of success of the task is then an increasing convex function 
of the level of effort. There is therefore a potential conflict between the preferences of the 
Principal and those of the Agent concerning the production technology. Basically, the Principal 
                                                 
4. Over   } ..., 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 { m g = Θ  , we have   0 ... 1 0 1 2 3 ≥ > > > > > > q q q q qm  . 
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always prefers a super-modular technology, while the Agent prefers a sub-modular one. Hence, 
although the incentive wage  
∗
2 w   respects the participation constraint, some agents may resist 
when the Principal implements a super-modular production technology. This resistance will be 
stronger when the firm moves from a sub-modular technology to a super-modular one with the 
same employees (indeed their wages will decrease
5).  
 
These two characteristics, from our point of view, may explain why it is difficult to implement a 
classical incentive scheme in real world. Indeed according to MacLeod and Parent (1999) and 
Prendergast (1999), in real world, very few firms use classical incentive schemes but instead a 
mechanism in which the employees' bonus depend on a subjective evaluation of their 
performance by the Principal.  
 
On the contrary, in an incentive scheme with individual evaluation interview, the Agent will get 
this wage (even if the production is a failure) if he has been evaluated by the Principal as having 
provided an effort of level   2 = k  . Moreover a mechanism with evaluation interview could 
mitigate the potential resistance of the agents concerning the implementation of super-modular 
technology, because the Agent then gets a higher wage than  
∗
2 w  , the classical incentive wage 
with a super-modular production technology.  
 
Let  I   be the evaluation mark obtained by the Agent after the production process:   
Θ = ∈ } 2 , 1 , 0 { I  . If   0 = I   or  1  then the agent does not receive a premium. If   2 = I   then the 







2   if I p
p  
  
Of course, this mechanism must respect the participation and the incentive constraints. Moreover 
it must meet the following constraints:  
 
 •  the principal expected benefit is at least equal to his expected benefit in the classical 
mechanism,  
 •  the agent's expected utility is at least equal to his expected utility in the classical mechanism 
(because classical mechanism is the benchmark).  
 
We assume here without loss of generality that the cost of an evaluation interview is equal to 
zero. Let us set   ) | Pr( k K i I
i
k = = = γ  , the probability that the Agent's level of effort were 
evaluated as being i when his true level of effort is k. Our bounded rationality assumption implies 
that the Principal make errors in his evaluation of the Agent's level of effort:   k i
i
k , 0 ∀ > γ  .  
 
                                                 
5. The decreasing of wage after an organizational change is not only theoretical. For instance in their empirical seminal paper, 
Hamilton et al. (2003) show that after a move from an individual production to a team one, high productivity workers take 
earnings losses when joining a team. 
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We will also assume that the probability of evaluating the Agent's effort equal to 2 when it is 





 ,   } 1 , 0 { ' ∈ ∀k  .  
 
Further, we define an evaluation system, denoted E, as a profile  
 
) ( , } { }, 2 , 1 , 0 { i k
i
k E γ = Θ =  
  
We will say that an evaluation system  E   is efficient in detecting a level of effort   Θ ∈ k   if the 
probability that the Agent's level of effort were evaluated as being  k  when his true level of 





γ γ >  ,   k k < ∀ '  ,   Θ ∈ ' k  .  
 
We are going to discuss some claims highlighting different conditions under which the Principal 
implements individual evaluation interview in the case of individual production.  
 
The  first claim is that the efficiency of the Evaluation System for the level of effort 2 is a 
necessary condition to the implementation by the Principal of existence of individual evaluation 
interviews.  
 
As a consequence, we are going to restrict ourselves to the class of Evaluation Systems which are 
efficient for the level of effort 2.  
 
According to our second claim, when the production technology is sub-modular, then a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the implementation of an incentive mechanism with evaluation 











q   : the marginal return from increasing the effort from level 1 to level 2 
must compensate for the bounded rationality of the Principal.  
 
The problem is that this necessary and sufficient condition will be difficult to fulfill
6. Indeed 





  is low. Therefore 
incentives mechanisms with evaluation interview will be rarely implemented when the 
production technology is sub-modular.  
 
When the production technology is super-modular, then (claim 3) it is possible to construct an 








q   : the relative increase in 
the probability of receiving the premium   p   when the Agent switches from the level of effort 0 
to the level of effort 2, has to be smaller than the relative increase in the probability of success of 
                                                 
6. Take for instance  
2
2 γ   close to 1 and  
2
0 γ   close to 0. 
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the task (which is for the principal the probability of receiving income  R ), when the Agent 
switches from the level of effort 0 to the level of effort 2.  
 








q   is not costly. For instance it is trivially satisfied 
when   0 0 = q  . So incentive mechanisms with evaluation interviews have a high likelihood to be 
implemented when the production technology is super-modular.  
 
Suppose now a super-modular production technology. Then (claim 4) the optimal contract in the 
incentive mechanism with evaluation interview is   } ' , 2
2 , { γ γ p   with:  
 







e u p    
 •    ' , 2










e q e u u −
−
+ −
− ≤ γ γ γ γ    
 
Two messages can be drawn from our fourth claim. According to the first message, the Agent's 







e u p , within the incentive mechanism with evaluation interview is higher than 
his wage in the classical incentive mechanism,   ) ( 0 2
2 1
2 q q
e u w −
− ∗ =  . Nonetheless the probability of 






2 q ≤ + + γ γ γ  .  
 
In order to understand the second message, let us recall that in the classical optimal contract (with 
no evaluation interview) the Agent's wage is higher when the technology is sub-modular than 
when it is super-modular. If the firm moves from a sub-modular technology to a super-modular 
one with the same employees, the Principal may use evaluation interviews to mitigate potential 
resistance from the Agents: he will pay the same wage as in the case of a sub-modular technology 
with no evaluation interviews but he will reduce the probability for the Agent of getting this 
wage. Namely if the Principal wants to pay the Agent for the wage corresponding to the effort  
2 = k   in the case of a sub-modular technology within the classical mechanism, then he will 
construct the incentive mechanism with evaluation interview in such a way that:  
 


























' ) ( 2
1 2
2
2 γ γ + − =
sub q q  
 
Where   1 2 1 2 ) ( q q q q
sub − = −   in the sub-modular technology case.  
 
To summarise, in an incentive scheme with evaluation interview, the Agent gets his wage   p   
only if he has been evaluated by the Principal as playing an effort equal to 2; on the other hand 
this wage   p   is greater that the one in the classical incentive scheme (however the probability of   9
getting   p   is weaker). Therefore we expect that the incentive schemes with evaluation interview 
will attract people having a low disutility of effort.  
 
Let us remind that   } 2 , 1 , 0 { = Θ   is the set of levels of effort legally possible but that the general 
set of levels of effort is   } ... 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 { m g = Θ  . Let us assume a continuum of agents but such that 
over   } 2 , 1 , 0 { = Θ   -the legal set of effort- agents have the same behavior with respect to their 
disutilities of effort. Therefore over   } 2 , 1 , 0 { = Θ   the Principal cannot offer a contract which 
depends on the Agent's type θ . Furthermore the Principal cannot construct a contract   ) 3 , ( ≥ k wk   
because a court of justice may find from  wk  the implicit level of effort (which is here illegal 
since it is higher than 2) that the Principal wants the Agent to provide. The disutility of effort is 







∈ ≤ ≤ +
= Θ ∈
=
} ,... 4 , 3 {     if     1 0 with    ) 2 (
} 2 , 1 , 0 {   if
) (






Such a functional form means that given a level of effort   3 ≥ k  , the smaller the type  θ  , the 
weaker the Agent's disutility of effort. Would an Agent of type  θ   increase his level of effort 
beyond the maximal legal level, without a monetary compensation
7? In order to answer to this 
question, let us state that an evaluation system   ) } { }, 2 , 1 , 0 { ( ,i k
i
k E γ = Θ =   includes an informal 
detection system of a given illegal level of effort k’≥ 3  if:  
1)   γ²k’  is well defined, and  
2)   γ²k’  respects the following pseudo-monotony condition:  γ²k’ ≥ γ²k’    , ∀ k ∈ {2,3,4,…k’-1} .  
It is easy to see that when the evaluation system satisfies the above property then if the Agent 
increases his level of effort beyond the required level   2 = k  , the probability of being detected 







e u p  ) as having provide a level of effort  2 = k , 
increases.  
 
To illustrate, let us consider an agent of type  0 = θ . Then if he provides an effort   m k =  , he has 
the same effort disutility than when providing an effort   2 = k   with almost the certitude of 







e u p  . Such an agent is rational when increasing his level of effort 
beyond the maximal legal level (  2 = k  ) because he increases his expected utility.  
 
Hence an agent provides a level of effort  k’  superior strictly to the maximal legal level if the 
evaluation system  ) } { }, 2 , 1 , 0 { ( ,i k
i
k E γ = Θ =   includes an informal detection system of the illegal 
level of effort  k’ .  
                                                 







e u p   does not change even if the Agent increases his effort 
beyond the required level. 
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According to our claim 5, assuming that the evaluation system  ) } { }, 2 , 1 , 0 { ( ,i k
i
k E γ = Θ =   includes 
an informal detection system of the illegal level of effort k’ , the Agent provides a level of effort 
at least equal to a given level  k’  (strictly greater than the maximal legal level) if and only if his 












k k  where 
} 3 {










k k  ,   
} 1 ' ,..., 2 { − ∈ ∀ k k  .  
 
The meaning of this claim is that if the evaluation system  ) } { }, 2 , 1 , 0 { ( ,i k
i
k E γ = Θ =   includes an 
informal system of detection of the illegal effort then the incentive mechanism with evaluation 
interview always includes in addition to the normal incentive effect, a selection effect whose 
consequence is to attract the agents whose disutility of effort is the weaker. Of course we do not 
say that the incentives mechanism with evaluation interview only attracts individuals who will 
provide an effort greater than the maximal level required by the Principal. Indeed we have 
assumed that the optimal contract constructed by the Principal is based on the legal set of efforts 
} 2 , 1 , 0 { = Θ . And over this set, the agents have the same behavior with respect to disutilities of 
effort. Nevertheless a simple reasoning shows that the selection effect will be higher in the case 
of production with evaluation interview than in the case without evaluation interview. To 
conclude, production structure with super-modular technology and evaluation interview will lead 
to an over-intensification of work in the sense that the Agents will provide efforts above the 
maximal effort required by the Principal. Of course since the probability  qk  of success of the 
task is, over   } ..., 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 { m g = Θ , a monotone increasing function of the effort level  k , then, 






k p R −
+ + ≥
γ γ  ), the selection effect also 







2 γ γ γ γ + + + + − k k p R q  : the effective expected profit of the Principal.  
 
 
2.3. The Role of Evaluation Interview in Team Production 
 
Concerning team production, even if the Principal faces the same problems as in individual 
production, the main issue (see Alchian and Demsetz, 1972 or Holmstrom, 1982) is free riding.  
 
Therefore in team production, the role of evaluation interviews is not restricted to the ex post 
evaluation (through an individual interview) of the Agents' level of effort. Indeed an ex post 
evaluation of agents' level of effort will not prevent them from shirking (except if individual 
evaluation interviews as a mechanism can detect with probability equal to 1 any agent who 
shirks).  
 
Thus we develop the following argument. The Principal prefers to implement a supermodular 
technology production. However in this case there are several Nash equilibria, among which the 
solution  ) 0 , 0 (  where the team produces no effort. Therefore in order to avoid the implementation 
of the equilibrium  ) 0 , 0 ( , it must be the case that firms enforce coordination among the agents. 
The issue is not new and is well documented in the literature: coordination can be obtained using   11
non-monetary incentives or monetary incentives. A famous example of non-monetary incentives 
is the so-called "peer pressure" by Kandel and Lazear (1992). We show that ex ante (to the 
production) individual evaluation interviews belong to the class of non-monetary coordinating 
incentives and therefore play exactly the same role -concerning the implementation of the 
equilibrium   ) 1 , 1 (   - as "peer pressure". However if implementing ex ante an evaluation interview 
solves the free-riding problem in team, the wage of the agents still depends on the conditional 
probability of success of the task. As in the individual production case, the Principal will 
implement an ex post evaluation interview which aims is to evaluate the level of effort and 
therefore to condition the wage not on the success of the task but on the evaluation of the Agents' 
effort.  
We will consider the same framework as in the individual production case; however the task 
(which is the same as in the individual production case) is now performed by a team of two 
agents who make an effort decision unobservable by the principal. Our definition of team 
(borrowed from Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) is very restricted here since only a global signal X 
concerning production is available. In particular the Principal cannot calculate the contribution of 
each agent to the production. Finally, let us recall that in the individual production case, the set of 
levels of effort legally possible was  { } 2 , 1 , 0 = Θ . Therefore in the team production case (in order 
to be consistent with the case of individual production) it must be the case 
8 that from the point of 
view of the Principal, the individual effort of agent  i  ( ) 2 , 1 =   denoted  Ki  belongs
9 to the set  
{} 1 , 0 . The probability of success of the task given the level of effort of the agents is :   
2 1 ) , | 1 Pr( 2 1 k k j i p k K k K X = = = =   ;  j i j i ≠ = = , 2 , 1 ; 2 , 1  .  
We assume also that:   0 00 10 01 11 ≥ > = > p p p p  .  
 
It is usual in the literature to state the following two properties of the team production 
technology. The first one is of course the super-modularity ( 00 10 10 11 p p p p − ≥ − ) or sub-
modularity ( 00 10 10 11 p p p p − ≤ − ). The other property is horizontal technological interdependence 
( 0 1 k k k p p − = ∆ ) which measures the increase in the probability of success (i.e. in the 
productivity) when one agent increases his effort level, for a given effort level of the other team 
member. When they are positive, such interdependencies capture the fact that teamwork makes 
an employee's productivity more dependent on the effort expanded by his co-workers.  
In team production, only a global signal is available for the Principal. Hence, he can only propose 
contracts with symmetric effort levels. 
∗
2 1k k w  is the optimal wage for effort levels  k1  et  k2  
required to agents 1 and 2 with   0 00 =




e u w −
− ∗ = . In team production, after signing 
the contract proposed by the principal, agents make their effort decision in the context of a 
coordination game. It is easy to see that this game leads to a unique Nash equilibrium   ) 1 , 1 (   
when   0 1 ∆ < ∆   and to two Nash equilibria   ) 0 , 0 (  a n d    ) 1 , 1 (   when   0 1 ∆ ≥ ∆ .  
 
                                                 
8. See Che and Yoo, 2001. 
 
9. Indeed the required total amount of effort for one task in team production is therefore the same as in the individual production 
case. 
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However 
∗
11 w   is a decreasing function of  1 ∆ . Hence ceteris paribus, firms will always prefer 
organisational forms characterized by both high horizontal interdependencies and super-
modularity ( 0 1 ∆ ≥ ∆ )
10. The problem is that in the case of super-modularity, the equilibrium  
) 1 , 1 (  is no longer unique. Therefore in order to avoid the implementation of the equilibrium  
) 0 , 0 (  , it must be the case that firms enforce coordination
11 among the agents. We will now show 
that ex ante individual interviews belong to the class of non-monetary coordinating incentives 
(and therefore play exactly the same role -concerning the implementation of the equilibrium   
() 1 , 1  - as "peer pressure"). Indeed, faced with such a moral hazard problem within his team, each 
agent ignores whether his co-worker shirks or not. Each individual hence forms beliefs over his 
partner's strategy, and chooses an effort level given these beliefs. As argued by Osborne and 
Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 3, section 3.2) the probabilities  ( ) ) 0 Pr(   and   ) 1 Pr( = = i i k k   may be 
interpreted as the players' beliefs about their peer's behavior. Unfortunately, it is easy to see that 
the only mixed strategies Nash equilibria are degenerated:   )) 0 , 1 ( ), 0 , 1 ((   and   )) 1 , 0 ( ), 1 , 0 ((  . The 
meaning is that both agents make an effort decision   ) 2 , 1 ( 1 = = i ki   only if they are sure that their 
partner adopts the same strategy. If the principal wants agents to coordinate on the Pareto-optimal 
equilibrium, he must design organisational devices affecting the probabilities associated with 
each strategy. This is the reason why we argue in claim 6 that evaluation interviews represent a 
mean to generate an ex ante signal towards the other agents to reinforce their beliefs about the 
team spirit
12. An important difficulty lies in the fact that the outcome of an evaluation interview is 
only known by the principal and the interviewed agent. It is therefore not public. In turn, it seems 
hard to figure out how the evaluation interview of an agent  i  would generate a signal (regarding 
himself) towards the other agents  i j j ≠ ,  . Though this may seem counter-intuitive at first sight, 
we will show that the individual evaluation interview is such that it does in fact make public the 
outcome of the interview. We assume that the interview is run before production takes place and 
that agent  i's type ti  {} L H i , = Λ = Λ ∈   is a private information where H   = "has team spirit" and  
L = "has no team spirit". The goal of the interview is of course to make agents truthfully reveal 
their types.  
 
Let now define the following
13 mechanism  CDG : 
                                                 
10. Indeed let  
a
1 ∆   such that   0 1 ∆ < ∆
a   and  
b
1 ∆   such that   0 1 ∆ ≥ ∆
b  . We have therefore:  ( ) ( )
b a w w 1 11 1 11 ∆ > ∆
∗ ∗ . 
 
11. By coordination within the team, we mean any instrument which leads to the implementation of the Nash Pareto-Optimal 
equilibrium (1,1). 
 
12. In the sense of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), an agent has team spirit (or loyal) if he does not shirk when working in a team. 
 
13. If the principal does not know the proportion of agents who have team spirit, then this proportion is a random variable for him. 








=   , with of course  
2 inf ≥ n . If the principal takes  InfSp   as the proportion of agents who have team spirit (that is if the principal is prudent) then 
the mechanism  CDG   is still strategy-proof. 
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1) The interview is run over a population of n individuals, n  2.
2) The Principal knows (whithout loss of generality)
the proportion
n0
n of agents who have team spirit, where n0  2.
3) The Principal runs the interview and if he observes that the number
of individuals who declare to be of type H (labeled  n0 )
is strictly higher than n0, then he knows that at least one individual
(among the  n 0) lies.
In such a case, the Principal stops the process : No team.
4)I f n0  n0, the Principal randomly selects two agents among the  n0
who declare to be of type H.
5) Each interviewed individual only receives the outcome of his own interview.
 
  
It is easy to see that (claim 6) if the mechanism
14  CDG is common knowledge then it is 
strategy-proof.  
 
This claim implies that when the Principal forms the team, each agent within the team infers that 
the other team member has a team spirit (CDG  being common knowledge), even though he does 
not observe the outcome of the other agent's interview. Moreover, it follows directly from the 
definition of team spirit that the agents do believe that the signal  ti  is perfectly correlated with 
the effort variable of agent i , ki , so that when agent i observes   H j = θ   (respectively   L j = θ  ),  
j i ≠  , he believes that   1 = j k   (respectively   0 = j k  ) and it is then optimal to decide   1 = i k   
(respectively   0 = i k  ). Thus when the mechanism  CDG  is implemented, the unique Nash 
correlated equilibrium is (1,1). Our claim 6 is somewhat close to a result by Prat (2002) showing 
that when there is a positive complementarity between workers in a team then this team should be 
composed of agents of the same type.  
 
If implementing ex ante (ex ante to the production) an evaluation interview solves the free-riding 
problem in team by selecting agents who have team-spirit, the wage of these agents still depend 
to the probability of success of the task  p11 . As in the individual production case, the Principal 
can implement an ex post evaluation interview which aims is to evaluate the level of effort and 





0 γ   (respectively  
1
1 γ ) be the probability that the Agent's level of effort were evaluated as 
                                                 
14. Of course the mechanism  CDG   can select people having the same demographic characteristics (gender, age, race,...) either 
because team spirit is objectively correlated with the agents' individual characteristics or because the principal and/or the agents 
have some prior beliefs concerning the demographic characteristics of people having team spirit. 
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being 1 while his true level of effort is 0 (respectively 1). Let us assume that  
1
0 γ   and  
1
1 γ   are 
strictly positive; and that the evaluation system is efficient in detecting a level of effort 1 (that is 
to say   <
1
0 γ  
1




1 11 2 γ γ + −  , where   p   is 
the Agent's wage when he has been evaluated as having provided the level of effort  1 ; under the 
participation and incentives constraints and also under the constraint that his (the Principal) 
expected benefit is at least equal to his expected benefit in the mechanism with only an ex ante 
individual evaluation and under the constraint that the agents' expected utility is at least equal to 
their expected utility in the mechanism with only an ex ante individual evaluation.  
 
The resolution of this program implies that the Principal can implement two kind of policy: either  
p   (the agent's wage in the incentive mechanism with ex ante and ex post evaluations)  
∗ ≥ 11 w   




1 γ γ +   (the 
probability of getting   p )   11 p ≤   (the probability of getting  
∗
11 w ) or   p  




1 p > +γ γ .  
 
However we think that the Principal will implement a mechanism in which  p  




1 γ γ +  
11 p ≤   instead of a mechanism with   p  




1 p > +γ γ  . The reason is that in the former, 
the effect of the selection effect on the Principal's effective expected profit will be higher. Indeed 




1 γ γ +   (the probability of getting the wage p) the higher will be the agent's effort 








∑   to be evaluated playing an effort equal to 1. We can 








2 γ γ γ γ − ≥ −   (that is if the evaluation 
technology is super-modular) then all the agents will play the level of effort   2 = k   (instead of 
the required   1 = k  )
15. More generally, if the evaluation system includes an informal system of 
detection system of an illegal level of work ( ) 3 ≥ k  then the agents of type   ( )
ke




1 γ γ θ   will 
play an effort   3 ≥ k  .  
 
To conclude, in team production evaluation interviews play two roles. On the one hand, they play 
the same role as in individual production, and one the other hand evaluation interviews is used by 
the firms as a non-monetary coordinating device which permits to solve the free riding problem 
within team, by selecting some individuals having the same characteristics correlated to team 
spirit. Among these two roles we think that the most important is actually the last one.  
 
 
2.4. Some testable predictions 
 
We can derive some predictions from our theoretical analysis.  
                                                 
15. And if the revenue  R   is high enough  ( )
11 22
1
2 . . p p
p R e i − ≥
γ
  then this overintensification of work will increase the Principal's 
effective expected profit. 
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1)  In individual or team production, evaluation interviews are associated with super-modular 
production technology. More precisely, while the conditions to implement evaluation 
interviews are difficult to fulfil when the production technology is sub-modular, evaluation 
interviews are easy to implement when the production technology is super-modular. The 
diffusion of evaluation practices are thus a symptom of the diffusion of super-modular 
technologies. Collective work practices could also reflect the diffusion of super-modular 
technology because they allow to reach higher level of effort by sharing the burden 
collectively, mitigating the pressure weighing on individual workers. 
2)  In individual production, evaluation interviews are mainly devoted to the ex post evaluation 
of the employees effort. In team production, evaluation interviews are of course also devoted 
to the ex post evaluation of the employees effort; nevertheless they play another important ex 
ante role which is to solve the free riding problem within teams. As a consequence, we expect 
that in team production, employees will be more evaluated (than employees working in 
individual production) and that their evaluation devices will be more complex.  
3)  From the employees’ point of view, evaluation interviews are a kind of insurance. Indeed in 
an incentive scheme with evaluation interviews, on the contrary to the classical incentive 
scheme, the Agent will get this wage even if the production is a failure, if he has been 
evaluated by the firm as having provided the required level of effort of level. Moreover in the 
case of team production, evaluation interviews solve the free riding problem within teams. 
4)  The agents' level of effort in incentive scheme with evaluation interviews is higher than the 
level of effort in the classical incentive scheme.  
5)  In individual production, a mechanism with evaluation interview always includes in addition 
to the standard incentive effect, a high selection effect whose consequence is to attract the 
agents whose disutility of effort is the weaker.  
6)  In team production, a mechanism with evaluation interview includes in addition to the 
standard incentive effect, two selection effects linked respectively to team spirit and disutility 
of effort.  
7)  The impact on the level of effort of the selection effect concerning disutility of effort is higher 
in individual production than in team production.  
8)  Evaluation Interviews in a context of super-modular technology lead to an overintensification 
of work in the sense that the employees’ level of effort will be higher than the one "required" 
by the firm. The reason is the selection effect regarding disutility of effort.  
9)  In firms which implement a scheme with evaluation interviews, the employees wage is higher 
than the one in a classical incentive scheme. 
10) In a scheme with evaluation interviews, the wage depends on the employee's evaluation mark 
which is itself based upon some precise common knowledge criteria (which are accepted by 
both parties -Firm and Employees). Hence evaluation interviews will be associated with a 
better objectivation of wage from the point of view of employees.  
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Of course our explanations of subjective evaluation through evaluation interview are not 
exclusive. Indeed other explanations exist in sociology, theories of organisations or industrial 
relations. For instance, evaluation interviews may contribute to elaborate the formalization of 





3. Empirical tests 
 
We are going to use a matched employer / employee survey, the survey on "computerisation and 
organisational change" (COI) to assess our theory of evaluation interviews. The information we 
have in the survey will not allow us to test all the predictions from our model. However, from the 
employee section of the survey, we have some information on the characteristics of work 
(whether individual or collective), on evaluation interviews, on effort and on wages. This will 
allows us to cover the main features underlined by our theoretical model. More precisely, we will 
be able to test whether evaluation interviews lead to higher levels of effort than classical 
incentive schemes (prediction 4). Our estimation strategy will also allow us to assess the 
existence of a selection effect associated with the implementation of evaluation interviews in 
individual and collective work organisations (predictions 5, 6 and 7). Furthermore, using 
measures of work overload, we will check whether evalutation interviews drive workers towards 
an excessive work intensity leading to inefficiencies. This is a possible consequence of our 
prediction 8 on overintensification. It is important to test this implication because work overload 
is a major factor of stress and has long term implication on the health of the workforce, especially 
in a context of aging. Finally we will be able to test our predictions on wage differentials and on 
the employees' knowledge of the rules driving wage setting between the scheme with evaluation 
interviews and the classical incentive scheme (predictions 9 and 10). 
 
 
3.1. The Data  
 
The COI survey has been conducted at the end of 1997 by the French public statistical system
17. 
We are going to work on a representative sample of manufacturing firms with more than 50 
employees and on a sample of randomly selected employees within these firms. In matched 
employer/employee surveys, the budget constraint implies a trade-off between trying to capture 
the diversity of firms and trying to capture the diversity of the work force within firms. By 
choosing to interview small sample of employees (1, 2 or 3) within each firm, COI chooses to 
favour the diversity of firms. As interviewed employees have at least one year of seniority within 
the firm, they belong to its core workforce. 
                                                 
16. Faced with the possibility of expressing themselves during interviews, employees would be less incited to contest 
management. 
 
17. The conception and coordination of the COI survey has been directed by the Centre d'Etudes de l'Emploi. The survey has been 
carried out in a consortium involving the Ministry of labour (DARES), the Ministry of Industry (SESSI), the Ministry of 
Agriculture (SCEES) and the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). It benefited from very high response 
rates: 82% for employers and 75% for the employees. For a detailed description of the survey, see Greenan and Hamon-Cholet 
(2001). 
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In the full sample of the labour force section of the survey, there are 4295 employees. However in 
our analysis we do not take into account employees with supervision activities (1214 individuals) 
or employees working part time (177 individuals). Indeed the former combine a position of 
Principal and of Agent that we have not investigated theoretically, while part time leads to badly 
measured effort and wages. We obtain a sub-sample of 2904 employees. 
The available information on the practice of individual evaluation interviews stems from the 
following question: Do you have at least one evaluation interview per year? (yes / no). Because 
of their seniority in the firm, we know that all interviewed employees had the opportunity of 
being evaluated at least once. 
The labour force section of the COI survey describes in detail work organisation. It includes a 
whole set of questions capturing whether work is structured around group activities. From these 
questions we build up five different measures of interaction between employees in the course of 
the work process: being part of a team, time spent in teamwork, intensity of communication with 
other workers, level of support from other workers, participation into meetings (see appendix 1 
for detailed questions). These five measure are positively correlated, with correlations ranging 
between 0.04 (intensity of communication with time spent in team work) and 0.18 (being part of 
a team and level of support from other workers). Thus they measure different dimension of 
collective work. We derive from these five measures a synthetic binary indicator of collective 
work. When it takes the value one, the employee is considered as being a "collective" worker, 
when it takes the value 0, he is considered as being an individual worker. According to this 
variable our sample of employees breaks down into 1537 individual workers and 1367 collective 
workers. 
Table 1 gives the distribution of individual evaluation interviews according to our synthetic 
binary indicator of collective work. 37.2% of the employees have been interviewed at least once 
in 1997. Evaluation interviews are positively correlated with collective work: 47% of collective 
workers have been evaluated against 29% of individual employees. 
 
                                             






(a) : Percentage with respect to the analysed  subsample of 2904 employees. 
 
 
The COI survey also measures different effort indicators. Productive effort is measured through 
two questions indicating if the employee works longer than the usual hours some days or some 
weeks. Productive effort is considered as very high if the employee sometimes increases hours 
worked for personal reasons, as high if he or she sometimes increase hours worked in response to 
the firm's demand and as low if longer hours never happen. According to these three situations, 
the productive effort indicator respectively takes a value of 2, 1 or 0. The cognitive effort 
indicator is a binary variable indicating if the employee makes propositions to improve his or her 
work stations, the production process or the machines. It measures an involvement into collective 
knowledge building about the productive activity, allowing continuous improvement of the 
  Individual Workers  Collective Workers 
Evaluation    
Yes  445 (29%  )  637 (47%  ) 
No  1092 (71%  ) 
a
  730 (53%  ) 
Total  1537(53%  )  1367(47%  )   18
production process. 
 
Two additional measures are included in the analysis to identify if effort is going beyond 
reasonable levels, creating an overload that could be detrimental for work efficiency and for the 
employee's health. A first variable indicates how often an employee has to hurry in the course of 
his or her work. Four states are taken into account: hurrying almost all the time, hurrying for one 
quarter of the time or more, hurrying for less than a quarter of the time and never. The hurry 
variable respectively takes the value 4, 3, 2 and 1 according to the intensity of the pressure. Work 
overload is also measured through a binary indicator telling whether the employee often has to 
interrupt one task to carry out another urgent and non anticipated one. 
Finally, we measure the employee's annualised net wage in euros. As it comes from an 
administrative data file used to compute social contributions, it is precisely measured and 
includes all bonuses, taxed allowances and compensations in kind. We also build up an indicator 
of the employees' ability to predict their wage. It rests on a question about the elements that have 
a big influence on the employee's wage or promotion, followed by a list of eight items. We 
compute the ratio of the number of yes to the list of items, on the number of yes and no, which 
gives an indicator taking its value between 0 and 1. 0 means that the employee has no idea of 
how to increase his or her wage and/or chance of promotion, 1 means that the employee knows 
that he or she can improve his or her situation and is aware of what to do to obtain this outcome. 
 
 
3.2. Estimation strategy 
 
We want to measure the impact of evaluation interviews on effort, work overload and wages, but 
we know, from our theoretical model that evaluation interviews induce a selection process. 
Employees with a low disutility of effort and, in the case on team work, with a team spirit are 
going to be attracted by jobs where evaluation interviews are conducted periodically. A possible 
way to measure outcomes related to evaluation interviews, taking into account the selection effect 
is to consider evaluation interviews as treatments and to apply a propensity score method to 
match each treated individual with a non-treated individual with the same characteristics in order 
to turn our non experimental data into a quasi experiment. 
A simple way to test the predictions of the model is to consider evaluation interviews as 
treatments and to evaluate the effect of this treatment on the chosen variables for measuring 
effort, wages, and beliefs about wages. More precisely, let  t  a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
employee declares being evaluated and 0 otherwise, then 3 quantities are of interest to us. The 
first is the average treatment effect over the whole population, written C  ; the second is the 
average treatment effect over the treated individuals, written  1 C  ; and the third is the average 
treatment effect over the non-treated individuals, written   0 C . More precisely, let  Y  the chosen 
variables for measuring effort, wages, and beliefs about wages. Then  C   measures the variation 
of  Y   that would be observed if the whole population was treated;   1 C   is an evaluation of the 
effect of the treatment in the usual sense since it concerns the treated population; and   0 C   is a 
prospective evaluation in the sense that it measures what would happen if the non-treated 
population was treated. We have:  
 
] [ 0 1 Y Y E C − =    19
 
] 1 | [ 0 1 1 = − = t Y Y E C  
 
] 0 | [ 0 1 0 = − = t Y Y E C  
 
Where   1 Y   is the observed value of  Y   that results when receiving treatment (that is when being 
evaluated),   0 Y   is the observed value of  Y   that results when do not receiving treatment (that is 
when do not being evaluated), and   ] . [ E   denotes expectation in the population. Intuitively, an 
estimate of an average treatment effect could be the difference between the average of  Y   over 
the population of treated individuals and its average over the population of non-treated 
individuals, that is,  
 
0 1 Y Y −  
 
Where   1 Y   and   0 Y   are respectively the average of  Y   for treated (evaluated employees) and 
the non-treated (non evaluated employees).  
However, broadly speaking the main problem when evaluating the effect of a treatment is that for 
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Then it can be shown that the average difference between treated and non-treated individuals can 
be the cause of a selection bias since the data does not result from a randomised experiment. And 
when testing evaluation effects (on effort, overload and wages) there is a need to control for 
naturally occurring systematic differences in background characteristics between the treated 
population and the non-treated population, which would not occur in the context of a randomised 
experiment. Moreover, according to predictions 5 and 6, individual evaluation interview affects 
employees' effort through a selection effect associated to disutility and/or to team spirit an 
incentive effect which in our case is estimated by the average treatment (evaluation) effect. 
Therefore in order to estimate the average treatment (evaluation) effect it is also necessary to 
control for the selection bias due to disutility. Although, it seems difficult to control "directly" for 
this selection effect because disutility and/or team spirit are not observable characteristics, we can 
assume that they are grounded on observable background characteristics of the employee and of 
the employer, and hence controlling for them allows to control for the selection. 
We will discuss in the next section the background characteristics we will take into account to 
estimate the effect of individual evaluation interview. We choose we choose to use the propensity 
score methodology introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This method reduces the entire 
collection of background characteristics to a single composite characteristic that appropriately 
summarises the collection. Propensity score technology allows to correct the selection bias by 
matching individuals according to their propensity score which is the estimated probability of 
receiving the treatment (of being evaluated) given background characteristics. We are going to 
use a non parametric Kernel matching estimator proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 
(1997, 1998) which under some regularity assumptions is convergent and asymptotically normal.    20
 
 
3.3. Determinants of individual evaluation interviews 
 
The first step of the propensity score method is to analyse the determinants of evaluation 
interviews taking into account background characteristics that influence the employee's 
probability of receiving a periodical evaluation interview and the three categories of outcomes we 
consider: effort, work overload and wages. 
In this step, it is very important to take into account individual effects as well as contextual 
effects. As we have pointed out in our theoretical model personal characteristics of the employee 
like team spirit or disutility of effort are going to play a crucial role in influencing both the 
chances of being evaluated and the outcomes we consider. These characteristics are not directly 
observable, but we are going to take into account observables that are possibly correlated with 
them: gender, age, seniority, education level and occupation. It is clear that these personal 
characteristics have impacts on effort levels, work overload and wages. 
The fact that our employee sample is matched with a survey describing the characteristics of 
firms is an important advantage in our estimation strategy. Our theoretical model has stressed that 
the production technology plays a role in the diffusion of evaluation interviews. A super-modular 
technology is more favourable than a sub-modular technology. In order to control for the 
technology, we are going to include in the regression size and sector dummies. Stemming from 
an employer database, information on size and sector is much more precise than the information 
usually included in labour force surveys. We also include a measure of the firm's computerisation 
intensity. We choose to build up a variable describing the intensity of numerical data transfers 
within and outside the firm. Moreover, evaluation interviews could be complementary to other 
organisational practices and these practices could also have an influence on outcomes. Eight new 
organisational practices are considered in the logistic regression: quality certification, total 
quality management, methods to analyse products and processes (value analysis, functional 
analysis, AMDEC), total productive maintenance (TPM), organisation in profit center, formal in 
house customer/supplier contracts, system of just in time delivery, system of just in time 
production. We also detail different teamwork practices: self managed teams, problem solving 
groups and project teams. Finally, we take into account the evolution of the number of 
hierarchical layers in the firm and variables indicating difficulties connected with the 
implementation of organisational changes. 
Appendix 3 presents the parameters estimated of the logistic models explaining individual 
evaluation interviews for individual workers and for collective workers. In the case of individual 
workers we find that employee characteristics have higher explanatory power than employer 
characteristics. More precisely, male workers in executive or middle management positions with 
either low seniority (1 or two years) or intermediate seniority (7 to 10 years) have a higher 
probability of being evaluated. We have to keep in mind that even though some of the 
interviewed workers have management positions, they have no formal hierarchical authority as 
they declare no subordinates. Among the employer characteristics, the only variables with 
significant influence are size, with of positive impact of the highest size cluster, sector, with a 
positive impact of five sectors (pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products; chemicals, 
rubber, and plastic products; electrical and electronic equipment; electrical and electronic 
components; and shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway) and quality certification (ISO 9001, ISO 
9002 and EAQF). 
   21
By contrast, in the case of collective workers, employer characteristics tend to explain more than 
employee characteristics. Indeed for team workers the only personal characteristic that influences 
the probability of being evaluated is the level of education: a second or a third level of education 
is associated with a coefficient that is positive and significant. On the employer side, size, sector, 
computer intensity, use of new organisational devices and use of teamwork have a significant 
impact on the probability of being evaluated. Employers with medium size (between 100 and 999 
employees) and belonging to pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products or to chemicals, 
rubber, and plastic products use evaluation interviews more frequently. Employers from printing, 
press and publishing and shipbuilding, aircraft and railways have a lower probability of being 
interviewed. The intensity of computerisation favours evaluation interviews of collective 
workers, as well as quality certification and total productive maintenance. On the opposite, 
employers using just in time delivery are less oriented towards evaluation interviews for 
collective workers. Having a non marginal fraction of production workers in problem solving 
groups favours evaluation interviews, while having a small fraction of non production workers 
participating in self managed teams and having management involved in project teams has a 
negative impact on evaluation interviews. In total, evaluation interviews for collective workers 
seem complementary with information technologies and new organisational practices. These 
managerial tools could support a super modular production technology, where the employer has a 
preference for higher levels of effort. 
 
 
3.4. Observing the outcomes of individual evaluation  
 
We are now going to discuss the matching evaluation of the effect of individual evaluation 
interviews on individual and collective workers on effort (table 2), work overload (table 3) and 
wages (table 4). In each table, we first compute as a benchmark the average outcome for 
individual and collective workers. Second we compute the average difference in outcome 
between workers that have been individually evaluated and workers that have not been evaluated. 
This estimator is often designated as the naï ve estimator of the treatment effect. Then we 
compute the three causal effects: the effect on the treated (C1), the effect on the non-treated (C0) 
and the global effect (C). The first effect is the matching evaluation strictly speaking, the second 
one represents the effect that evaluation interviews would have if they were implemented on the 
non evaluated population of workers and the last one is the effect that would be obtained if 
evaluation interviews were extended to the entire population. 
 
a. Effort  
 
We observe higher levels of productive and cognitive efforts when work is collective rather than 
individual (table 2). This was not entirely expected because our model underlined that one of the 
advantage of collective work was to share the burden of higher levels of effort between workers. 
However, other effects might play a role here. Our theoretical model, as well as, the analysis of 
determinants of evaluation interviews suggests that collective work is positively correlated with 
super modular production technologies. Another explanation could lie in synergy and peer 
pressure effects connected with collective work. 
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(a) : The standard deviation of the treatement effect is computed using 
bootstrap with 300 simulations. The characteristics of the support over 300 
simulations are : min=1352; max=1501; mean=1426.48 
  
(b) : The standard deviation of the treatement effect is computed using 
bootstrap with 300 simulations. The characteristics of the support over 300 
simulations are: min=1124; max=1304; mean=1229.03 
(c)
∗ ∗ ∗
p-value<0.01 ,.  
∗ ∗
  0.01≥ p-value<0.05 ,   
∗
 0.05 ≥ p-value < 0.1 . 
 
(d) :  See B. of appendix 1 for a description of these variables. 
 
 
As predicted by our model, we observe that the level of effort whether productive or cognitive is 
higher when workers are individually evaluated than in the classical incentive scheme (prediction 
4). 
The causal treatment effect on productive effort is stronger for individual workers than for 
collective workers. And the selection effect is of opposite sign. Individual workers displaying 
higher level of effort are selected in the population of evaluated workers, when they are selected 
out in the case of collective work. This result corroborates our prediction 7 although our model 
gives no specific clue to understand our surprising result on collective workers. The extension of 
evaluation interviews to the whole population of collective workers would consequently increase 
productive effort, although it is already high in this case. 
The observed effects on cognitive effort are more straightforward. Evaluation interviews 
similarly affect cognitive effort for individual and collective workers: they increase by 14% the 
propensity to make propositions for improving the production process. In the case of cognitive 
effort, the selection effect has identic sign among individual and collective workers, but it is 
stronger in the first case, as stated in prediction 7. 
 
b. Work overload 
 
Individual and collective workers work with a similar time pressure: the average of hurry is 2.67 









  PRODUCTIVE EFFORT 
d
     
     Average productive effort    0.564    0.720 
     Average difference E/NE    0.127 
∗ ∗ ∗   
c
     0.092 
∗ ∗ ∗   
     Effect on the treated (C1)    0.084 
∗ ∗      0.120 
∗ ∗   
     Effect on the non-treated (Co)    0.093 
∗ ∗      0.100 
∗ ∗   
     Global effect (C)    0.091 
∗ ∗      0.110 
∗ ∗   
  COGNITIVE EFFORT 
d
     
     Average cognitive effort    0.507    0.722 
     Average difference E/NE    0.143 
∗ ∗ ∗      0.140 
∗ ∗ ∗   
     Effect on the treated (C1)    0.099 
∗ ∗      0.110 
∗ ∗   
     Effect on the non-treated (Co)    0.120 
∗ ∗      0.110 
∗ ∗   
     Global effect (C)    0.114 
∗ ∗      0.110 
∗ ∗     23
than a quarter of their time. Our second indicator of work overload is higher for collective 
workers: 65% of collective workers experience task interruptions in the course of their work 
whereas 53% of individual workers face interruptions. 
 







(a) : The standard deviation of the treatement effect is computed using 
bootstrap with 300 simulations. The characteristics of the support over 300 
simulations are : min=1352; max=1501; mean=1426.48 
 
(b) : The standard deviation of the treatement effect is computed using 
bootstrap with 300 simulations. The characteristics of the support over 300 
simulations are: min=1124; max=1304; mean=1229.03 
(c) : 
∗ ∗ ∗
p-value<0.01 ,.  
∗ ∗
  0.01≥ p-value<0.05 ,   
∗
 0.05 ≥ p-value < 0.1 . 
 
(d) :  See C. of appendix 1 for a description of these variables. 
 
 
However, it is in the case of individual workers that evaluation interviews have a significant 
impact as it appears to mitigate work overload. Individual workers that are periodically evaluated 
work under lower time pressure and are less exposed to task interruptions. In the case of time 
pressure, the selection effect seems to play and important role as the causal effect on the treated is 
not significant. But evaluation interviews also seem to have a protective effect on their own 
because the effect on the non-treated is negative, significant and stronger than the naïve 
estimator. Individual workers who have been selected out from evaluation interviews would 
beneficiate from their implementation. As far as task interruptions are concerned, the protective 
effect of evaluation interviews is not explained by a selection effect, it is a pure outcome of this 
managerial device. 
Evaluation interviews do not protect collective workers from work overload, but they do not 
increase their risk of exposition either. It is also an interesting result, knowing that collective 
workers produce higher levels of productive and cognitive efforts. 
These results could be indirect evidence of prediction 8. Evaluation interviews in a context of 
super-modular technology lead to an overintensification of work, but not to work overload. On 
the contrary, they seem to mitigate work overload, either through a selection effect as described 








 •  HURRY 
d
     
     Average overload    2.666    2.640 
     Average difference E/NE    -0.143 
∗ ∗   
c
     -0.110 
∗   
     Effect on the treated (C1)    -0.142 (ns)    -0.108 (ns) 
     Effect on the non-treated (Co)    -0.189 
∗ ∗      -0.073 (ns) 
     Global effect (C)    -0.176 
∗ ∗      -0.089 (ns) 
 •  INTERRUPT 
d
     
     Average overload    0.526    0.650 
     Average difference E/NE    -0.053 
∗      0.009 (ns) 
     Effect on the treated (C1)    -0.065 
∗ ∗      0.002 (ns) 
     Effect on the non-treated (Co)    -0.066 
∗ ∗      -0.003 (ns) 
     Global effect (C)    -0.066 
∗ ∗      -0.000(ns)   24
in our theoretical model, or through a pure effect that we have not investigated theoretically. 
 
c. Wage setting 
 
Collective workers earn more, on average than individual workers (table 4). We also observe that 
on average evaluated employees earn more than employees in a classical incentive scheme, 
confirming prediction 9. These moneraty gains are higher for collective than for individual 
workers: 1925 euros per year on average against 1654 euros per year. For individual workers, this 
difference is entirely explained by the selection effect: the causal effects on the treated in not 
significantly different from zero and the causal effect on the non-treated is also non significant. 
Contrary to individual workers, the monetary gain of collective workers is only slightly lower 
when selection is taken into account: the gain falls from 1925 euros to 1310 euros if we consider 
the causal effect on the treated, to 1062 if we consider the causal effect on the non-treated, and to 
1174 if we consider the global effect. 
 
 







(a) : The standard deviation of the treatement effect is computed using 
bootstrap with 300 simulations. The characteristics of the support over 300 
simulations are : min=1352; max=1501; mean=1426.48 
 
(b) : The standard deviation of the treatement effect is computed using 
bootstrap with 300 simulations. The characteristics of the support over 300 
simulations are: min=1124; max=1304; mean=1229.03 
(c) : 
∗ ∗ ∗
p-value<0.01 ,.  
∗ ∗
  0.01≥ p-value<0.05 ,   
∗
 0.05 ≥ p-value < 0.1 . 
(d) : See D. and E. of appendix 1 for a description of these variables. 
 
 
Concerning the employee's ability to predict his or her wage we first note that this ability is 









  ANNUALISED NET WAGE (IN EUROS) 
d
     
     Average net wage    15003    16586 
     Average difference E/NE    1654 
∗ ∗ ∗   
c
     1925 
∗ ∗ ∗   
     Effect on the treated (C1)    198 (ns)    1310 
∗ ∗   
     Effect on the non-treated (Co)    275 (ns)    1062 
∗ ∗   
     Global effect (C)    253 (ns)    1174 
∗ ∗   
  EMPLOYEE'S ABILITY TO PREDICT HIS 




     Average ability to predict    0.491    0.597 
     Average difference E/NE    0.164 
∗ ∗ ∗      0.136 
∗ ∗ ∗   
     Effect on the treated (C1)    0.145 
∗ ∗ ∗      0.110 
∗ ∗ ∗   
     Effect on the non-treated (Co)    0.147 
∗ ∗ ∗      0.100 
∗ ∗ ∗   
     Global effect (C)    0.146 
∗ ∗ ∗      0.100 
∗ ∗ ∗     25
average difference between evaluated and non evaluated workers is significantly different from 
zero. Moreover this effect of evaluation interview still remains significant when one corrects for 
the selection effect. As stated by prediction 10, evaluated workers have a better knowledge of the 






In this paper we proposed a theoretical framework based on a Principal-Agent model to analyse 
the underlying mechanisms of individual evaluation interviews in the case of individual 
production and of team production. We distinguish an ex post evaluation interview that builds a 
subjective evaluation of employees' effort and an ex ante evaluation interview which, in the case 
of team production works as a coordination device through the fostering of a team spirit. This 
theoretical analysis allows deriving testable predictions regarding the effect of individual 
evaluation interviews on productive and cognitive effort, on work overload and on wage setting. 
 
Using a matched employer / employee survey on computerisation and organisational change 
(COI), we are able to test part of these predictions and to corroborate them. First, evaluation 
interviews have a positive impact on productive and cognitive effort. Second, evaluation 
interviews increase effort through two effects: the classical incentive effect and also a selection 
effect. Third, the selection effect is stronger in the case of individual production compared with 
the case of team production. Forth evaluated employees earn more than employees in a classical 
incentive scheme and fifth, evaluated workers have a better knowledge of the rules driving wage 
setting. 
 
Our theoretical model also suggests a higher propensity to evaluate workers in firms when the 
production technology is of a super-modular type and an overintensification of work in such a 
technological context. Our empirical results tend to indicate that collective work is positively 
correlated with super modular technologies as collective workers are more frequently evaluated 
and provide a higher level of effort than individual workers. However, evaluation interviews are 
not associated with work overload. On the contrary, individual workers seem to be protected 
from work overload when they are evaluated and collective workers do not register a higher 
exposure to work overload even though they provide higher levels of effort. This could be an 
indirect evidence of the selection effect already stressed. Evaluated workers produce higher levels 
of effort, but their personal characteristics or the characteristics of their employers allow them to 
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Appendix 1: Variables constructed from the labour force section of the COI survey 
 
A.  Measures of Collective Work.  
 
In the COI survey, a sample of randomly selected employees within interviewed firms (1, 2 or 3 
per firm) are asked to describe in detail the way they work at the time when they are being 
surveyed. 
 
Measure 1: Teamwork  
 
This measure is associated to the following question: "Do you sometimes do your work in group 
or collectively?"Responses are either "yes" or "no".  
 
 
Measure 2: Time spent in teamwork   
 
This measure is constructed from the following question asked to employees who declared 
working in group or collectively: "How much of your working time do you work in group or 




Measure 3: Communication in the firm   
 
This measure is constructed from the following 4 questions: "Apart from your superiors, are there 
other persons who give you indications on what you have to do? (responses are either "yes" or 
"no", or it does not apply) (1) "Colleagues you usually work with?" (2) "Other persons or 
departments in the firm?" "Apart from your subordinates do you give indications to other persons 
on what they have to do? (responses are either "yes" or "no", or it does not apply) (3) "Colleagues 
you usually work with?" (4) "Other persons or departments in the firm?"  
Then a "Low" intensity of communication corresponds to 0 or 1 positive answer among these 4 




Measure 4: Support from other workers  
 
The measure is constructed from the following 3 questions: "If you have a temporary excess 
workload or if you are uneasy with a difficult task are you helped by..." (responses are either 
"yes" or "no", or it does not apply) (1) "Your superiors?" (2) "Colleagues you usually work 
with?" (3) "Other persons or departments in the firm?"  
Then a "Low" level of support from other workers corresponds to 0 or 1 positive answer and a 
"High" level of support corresponds to at least 2 positive answers among the 3 questions.    28
Measure 5: Participation into meetings  
 
The measure is constructed from the following question: "How many times a year do you 
participate into meetings in the context of your work? Then a "Low" participation into meetings 
corresponds to 0 or only one meeting a year and a "High" participation into meetings corresponds 
to at least 2 meetings a year.  
 




























Table A.2:  Correlation Coefficients between these five measures of interaction between employees 
 
  measure 1  measure 2  measure 3  measure 4  measure 5 
measure  1  1.00000      
measure 2  0.63486  1.00000       
measure 3  0.15159  0.04493  1.00000     
measure  4  0.17993 0.11736 0.14987 1.00000   
measure  5  0.13480 0.04775 0.17168 0.08567 1.00000 
 
    
  Frequency  Percent 
Measure 1: Teamwork    
No (0)  1422  48.97 
Yes (1)  1482  51.03 
Measure 2: Teamwork intensity    
Less than 1/4 of time (0)  2045  70.42 
1/4 of time or more (1)  859  29.58 
Measure 3: Communication intensity    
Low (0)  1019  35.09 
High (1)  1885  64.91 
Measure 4: Level of support    
Low (0)  1537  52.93 
High (1)  1367  47.07 
Measure 5: Participation into meetings    
Low (0)  1557  53.62 
High (1)  1347  46.38   29
 
B.  Measures of effort.   
 
Two dimensions of effort are captured in the COI survey. 
 
The first one describes the level of productive effort. It is built from the answers to the two 
following questions: (1) "do you work more than ordinarily?" (response is either "yes" or "no"); 
(2) If yes, "do you work more than ordinarily for personals reasons?" (responses is either "yes" or 
"no").  
Employee's effort is then a variable with 3 levels: 0 when the answer to (1) is "no", 1 when the 
answer to question (1) is "yes" and the answer to question (2) is "no", 2 when both the answers to 
questions (1) and (2) are "yes".  
 
The second one describes the level of cognitive effort or, more precisely the degree of 
implication into collective knowledge building about the production process. It is built from the 
answers to the following questions: (1) "in the context of your work, do you make propositions to 
improve your work station, the production process, the machines...?" (response is either "yes" or 
"no"); 
 
C.  Measures of work overload 
 
Two indicators measure work overload. 
 
•  Hurry is a discrete variable. It is equal to 1 if the employee states that he never has to hurry to 
do his work. It is equal to 2 if he states that it is the case for less than one quarter of the time. 
It is equal to 3 if he states that it is the case for one quarter of the time or more. And it is equal 
to 4 if he states that it he has to hurry almost all the time.  
•  Interrupt is a dummy variable equal to one when the employee states that he often has 
interrupt one task to carry out another urgent and non anticipated one. It is equal to 0 
otherwise.  
 
D.  Measure of monetary incentives   
 
Monetary incentives are captured through annualised net wage (in euros). It comes from the 
annual declarations of social data (DADS) which is an administrative file used to compute the tax 
on wages. It groups all earnings paid in cash or kind between the 1st of January and the 31st of 
December 1996 less social contributions (social security, pensions, and unemployment benefit). 
This compensation includes base wage, all bonuses, taxed allowances and compensations in kind. 
Bonuses associated with the two French profit sharing regimes (participation and inté ressement) 
are not included when they are not taxed. However, bonuses connected to participation schemes 
are generally not taxed when the reverse is true for bonuses connected to inté ressement schemes. 
It is the length of the period during which bonuses remain unavailable that determines taxation. 
In the case of participation, when this unavailability period is shortened to three years, the 
bonuses become partly eligible to taxation. In the case of intéressement, bonuses are partly 
exonerated from taxes when they are blocked for a while in a company saving scheme. 
If we except bonuses connected with participation, compulsory in firms with more than 50 
employees, most of the earnings that contribute to an individualization of compensations are   30
taken into account in our variable. Thus, we may interpret it as an output of the wage policy of 
the firm. 
Lastly, compensations correspond to employment periods that vary from one employee to the 
other. We have annualised the information we had, taking into account the number of days 
worked. This does not correct for part time, but only 6% employees in our sample declare 
working part time.  
 
 
E.  Employee's ability to predict his wage   
 
This variable is built from the answers to the 8 following questions:  
"Which of the following elements have a big influence on your wage or on your promotion" ( for 
each element response is either "yes" or "no" or it does not apply): (1) to do a high-quality work?; 
(2) to carry assignments to the letter?; (3) to be in good terms with the boss (bosses)?; (4) to be in 
good terms with the colleague(s)?, (5) To take up training courses?, (6) to learn how to use new 
technologies?; (7) The firm's performances?; (8) other reasons?  
Employee's ability to predict his wage is then the ratio of number of "yes" given to these 8 
questions to the number of questions where the employee answered "yes" or "no".    31
 
Appendix 2: Variables constructed from the Firm section of the COI survey 
 
 
A. Firms' computerization intensity   
 
This variable in constructed from the question near to the firms:"did/do your firm realize/ realized 
data transfers by means a computer interface" (responses are either "yes" or "no"): (1) "within the 
management service?" (2) "between management and production service?" (3) "between 
management and suppliers, subcontractors?" (4) "between management and client firms? " (5) 
"between management et social organisms public power?" (6) "between conception services and 
production ?" (7) "between conception and suppliers, subcontractors?" (8) "Within the production 
services or between manufacture unities?" (9) "between production and suppliers, 
subcontractors?" (10) "between production and client firms?"  
Then intensity 1 corresponds to 0 or 1 "yes"; intensity 2 corresponds to 2 or 3 "yes"; intensity 3 
corresponds to 4 or 5 "yes"; and intensity 4 corresponds to 5 or more than 5 "yes". Reference is 
then intensity 1.  
 
 
B. Average number of task each type of individual is responsible for (NMT)   
 
This variable is constructed from the question asked to the firms: "In general who is/was 
authorized in 1997 to...(more than 1 answer possible among Management/Production 
Worker/Specialist)": (1) adjust installations; (2) perform first level maintenance; (3) allocate 
tasks to production workers; (4) inspect quality of supplies; (5) inspect quality of production; (6) 
participate in performance improvements; (7) participate in project teams; (8) stop production in 
case of an incident; (9) troubleshoot in case of an incident; (10) start production again in case of 
an incident.  
The qualitative variable  NMT  with 4 items is constructed as follows:  7 . 1 ≥ NMT   (joint 
responsibility of indirect task)  7 . 1 4 . 1 < ≤ NMT   (medium sharing of responsibility) 
4 . 1 1 ≤ < NMT   (low sharing of responsibility)  1 ≤ NTM  (disjoined responsibilities). And 
reference is   1 ≤ NTM .   32
Appendix 3: Logistic regression results for the binary outcome "Evaluated/Not 
evaluated" 
 
A. The case of individual production.  
 




Pr  >   ChiSq 
Intercept -2.0329  0.3485  34.0305  <.0001 
Socio-demographic characteristics of the employee  
 
      
 •  Gender 
a
   -0.2524 0.1519  2.7595  0.0967 
 •  Age 
b
  :        
15 to 24  -0.1760  0.4762  0.1366  0.7116 
25 to 39  -0.0446  0.1963  0.0515  0.8205 
40 to 49  0.2130  0.1865  1.3044  0.2534 
 •  Years in the firm 
c
  :        
1 to 2  0.6301  0.2374  7.0452  0.0079 
3 to 6  0.2496  0.1952  1.6355  0.2010 
7 to 10  0.3229  0.1756  3.3827  0.0659 
 •  Level of education 
d
 :        
Vocational training (CAP and BEP) -0.0175  0.1503  0.0135  0.9074 
Second level education (BAC) -0.0885  0.2581  0.1177  0.7316 
Third level education -0.0496  0.2607  0.0363  0.8489 
  Professional type 
e
 :        
Executives 0.6554  0.3603  3.3089  0.0689 
Middle management 0.7697  0.2356  10.6728  0.0011 
Clerk 0.3463  0.2461  1.9801  0.1594 
Skilled blue collar  -0.0568  0.1670  0.1156  0.7339 
General characteristics of the firm        
 •  Firm size 
f
 :        
100 to 499 -0.0328  0.1744  0.0355  0.8506 
500 to 999  0.0294  0.2264  0.0168  0.8968 
1000 and more  0.6202  0.2525  6.0334  0.0140 
 •  Industry sector 
g
 :        
Mineral products 0.4561  0.3481  1.7165  0.1901 
Textile 0.4668  0.3269  2.0391  0.1533 
Clothing and leather -0.2872  0.4127  0.4845  0.4864 
Wood and paper 0.1410  0.3348  0.1773  0.6737 
Printing, press, publishing 0.2648  0.3902  0.4605  0.4974 
 Production of propellants and fuels 1.0360  1.4831  0.4880  0.4848 
Chemicals, rubber, and plastic products 0.6593  0.2753  5.7342  0.0166 
Pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products 1.7797  0.3673  23.4742  < .0001 
Foundry and metal work products  -0.0104  0.2843  0.0013  0.9709 
Mechanical engineering 0.1636  0.2718  0.3625  0.5471 
Household equipment 0.0894  0.3122  0.0821  0.7745 
Electrical and electronic equipment  0.9187  0.4546  4.0840  0.0433 
Electrical and electronic components  0.6605  0.2988  4.8870  0.0271 
Automobile  0.3523  0.3630  0.9420  0.3318 
Shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway  0.6672  0.3829  3.0367  0.0814 
a
  Reference is "men". 
b
  Reference is "50 and more". 
c
  Reference is "11 and more". 
d
  Reference is "with no degree except 
CEP or BEPC". 
e
  Reference is "unskilled blue collar". 
f
  Reference is "99 and less". 
g
  Reference is "food industries".  33
                  Appendix 3: Logistic regression results for the binary outcome 
"Evaluated/Not evaluated"  
  




  Reference is "intensity 1". See A. of appendix 2 for the construction of this variable.  
i
  The variable is equal to 1 when the firms states that such an obstacle has been either "quite important", or "important", or "very 
important", and 0 when she states that it has been "unimportant".  
j
  Response is either "yes" or "no". 
k
  Reference is "0". 
l
  Reference is "less than 10%".  
 
 




Pr  >  ChiSq 
Firms' computerization intensity 
h
        
Intensity 2  0.0295  0.1914  0.0238  0.8773 
Intensity 3  0.1274  0.2034  0.3923  0.5311 
Intensity 4  0.0664  0.2266  0.0860  0.7694 
Obstacles to the organizational changes        
Tensions between the services 
i
   -0.2390 0.1760  1.8428  0.1746 
Tensions with the shareholders 
i
   0.0501 0.2123  0.0558  0.8133 
Difficulties in the relations with the other firms 
i
   0.0393 0.1899  0.0429  0.8359 
Difficulties to school or to reclassify the staff 
i
   -0.0221 0.1621  0.0186  0.8915 
Non executive staff adaptations and establishment problems 
i
   -0.0908 0.1751  0.2688  0.6041 
Executive staff adaptations and establishment problems 
i
   0.2754 0.1679  2.6886  0.1011 
Clashes with the staff (petitions, strikes,...) 
i
   -0.0970 0.2035  0.2271  0.6337 
Use of new organizational devices        
ISO 9001, ISO 9002, EAQF Certification 
j
   0.4734 0.1616  8.5854  0.0034 
Other certification or total quality management 
j
   0.0457 0.1394  0.1073  0.7432 
Value analysis, functional analysis, or "AMDEC" method 
j
   0.00832 0.1633  0.0026  0.9593 
5S method or Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) method 
j
   0.2457 0.1768  1.9307  0.1647 
Organization in profit centers 
j
   0.1212 0.1398  0.7517  0.3859 
Formal in-house customer/ supplier contracts 
j
   0.0257 0.1402  0.0335  0.8547 
System of "Just in time" delivery 
j   0.1323 0.1786  0.5483  0.4590 
System of "Just in time" production 
j
   -0.0757 0.1793  0.1785  0.6727 
       Evolution in hierarchical layers between 1994 and 1997 
k
  
      
1 and more  -0.0725  0.2648  0.0750  0.7842 
-1 -0.1617  0.1748  0.8556  0.3550 
-2 and less  0.1750  0.2874  0.3707  0.5426 
Team work        
        •  Share of production workers participating in self  
managed teams 
l
 :        
10%  to less than 50%   -0.1373  0.1965  0.4879  0.4849 
50% and more  0.1451  0.2585  0.3149  0.5747   34
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A. The case of individual production.  
 




Pr  >  ChiSq 




     
10%  to less than 50%   0.3005  0.1927  2.4314  0.1189 
50%  and more  0.5594  0.3928  2.0281  0.1544 
       •  Share of others workers participating in project teams 
l  : 
      
10%  to less than 50%   0.1398  0.1958  0.5101  0.4751 
50%  and more  -0.9496  0.5843  2.6415  0.1041 
        •  Share of others workers participating in self managed teams 
l
 : 
      
10%  to less than 50%   0.1439  0.2051  0.4921  0.4830 
50%  and more -0.1158  0.3478  0.1108  0.7392 




      
10%  to less than 50%   -0.1922  0.2010  0.9143  0.3390 
50%  and more -0.0789  0.3770  0.0438  0.8343 
 •  Share of others workers participating in project teams 
l
 :        
10%  to less than 50%   -0.2005  0.1941  1.0673  0.3016 
50%  and more  0.3645  0.3384  1.1598  0.2815 
 •  Who is/was authorized in 1997 to participate in project teams?:         
Management 
m
    -0.2209 0.1608  1.8877  0.1695 
Production worker 
m
   0.0596 0.1448  0.1694  0.6806 
Specialist 
m
   -0.2073 0.1627  1.6232  0.2027 
 •  Average number of task each type 
of individual is responsible for 
n
 : 
      
1.1 to 1.4  -0.0469  0.1864  0.0635  0.8011 
1.5 to 1.7  0.1619  0.2226  0.5292  0.4669 
1.8 and more 0.3439  0.2386  2.0764  0.1496 
l
  Reference is "less than 10%". 
m
  Response is either "yes" or "no".  
n
  Reference is " 1 ≤ ". See B. of appendix 2 for the construction of the variable.  
 
   35
                  Appendix 3: Logistic regression results for the binary outcome 
"Evaluated/Not evaluated"  
 
 
B. The case of team production.  
 




Pr  >  ChiSq 
Intercept -1.7432  0.3745  21.6633  <  .0001 
Socio-demographic characteristics of the employee        
 •  Gender 
a
   -0.1403 0.1523  0.8481  0.3571 
 •  Age 
b
 :        
15 to 24  0.5015  0.4257  1.3880  0.2387 
25 to 39  0.2781  0.2295  1.4691  0.2255 
40 to 49 0.2781  0.2295  1.4691  0.2255 
 •  Years in the firm 
c
 :        
1 to 2  -0.2096  0.2443  0.7363  0.3908 
3 to 6 0.1818  0.1820  0.9972  0.3180 
7 to 10  0.0170  0.1730  0.0097  0.9217 
 •  Level of education 
d
 :        
Vocational training (CAP and BEP) 0.1829  0.1567  1.3621  0.2432 
Second level education (BAC) 0.4481  0.2421  3.4263  0.0642 
Third level education 0.5279  0.2645  3.9823  0.0460 
 •  Professional type 
e
 :        
Executives 0.5416  0.3485  2.4147  0.1202 
Middle management 0.1200  0.2284  0.2761  0.5993 
Clerk -0.0121  0.2972  0.0017  0.9675 
Skilled blue collar -0.1469  0.1743  0.7101  0.3994 
General characteristics of the firm        
 •  Firm size 
f
 :        
100 to 499  0.3510  0.1765  3.9524  0.0468 
500 to 999 0.7059  0.2080  11.5179  0.0007 
1000 and more  0.1941  0.2422  0.6426  0.4228 
 •  Industry sector 
g
 :        
Mineral products -0.2853  0.3202  0.7942  0.3728 
Textile  0.3355  0.4096  0.6708  0.4128 
Clothing and leather -0.1220  0.3734  0.1068  0.7439 
Wood and paper  -0.4769  0.3661  1.6974  0.1926 
Printing, press, publishing -0.8333  0.4390  3.6032  0.0577 
Production of propellants and fuels  1.2745  0.9040  1.9877  0.1586 
Chemicals, rubber, and plastic products  0.6759  0.2593  6.7962  0.0091 
Pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products 1.2302  0.3578  11.8237  0.0006 
Foundry and metal work products -0.2956  0.2752  1.1535  0.2828 
Mechanical engineering -0.0338  0.2637  0.0164  0.8980 
Household equipment 0.1161  0.3083  0.1418  0.7065 
Electrical and electronic equipment  0.3344  0.3679  0.8263  0.3633 
Electrical and electronic components  0.1719  0.2950  0.3396  0.5601 
Automobile -0.2314  0.3329  0.4832  0.4870 
Shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway  -0.6255  0.3706  2.8479  0.0915 
a
  Reference is "men". 
b
  Reference is "50 and more". 
c
  Reference is "11 and more". 
d
  Reference is "with no degree except 
CEP or BEPC". 
e  Reference is "unskilled blue collar". 
f  Reference is "99 and less". 
g   Reference is "food industries". 
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h
  Reference is "intensity 1". See A. of appendix 2 for the construction of this variable.  
i
  The variable is equal to 1 when the firms states that such an obstacle has been either "quite important", or "important", or "very 
important", and 0 when she states that it has been "unimportant".  
j
  Response is either "yes" or "no".  
k   Reference is "0".  
l
  Reference is "less than 10%". 




Pr  >  ChiSq 
Firms' computerization intensity 
h
        
intensity 2  0.3321  0.1888  3.0940  0.0786 
intensity 3  0.4203  0.1960  4.5997  0.0320 
intensity 4  0.3323  0.2140  2.4118  0.1204 
 Obstacles to the organizational changes        
Tensions between the services 
i
   -0.0540 0.1773  0.0927  0.7608 
Tensions with the shareholders 
i
   -0.2445 0.2312  1.1179  0.2904 
Difficulties in the relations with the other firms 
i
   -0.0976 0.1999  0.2382  0.6255 
Difficulties to school or to reclassify the staff 
i
   0.0598 0.1538  0.1513  0.6973 
Non executive staff adaptations and establishment problems 
i
   0.0411 0.1639  0.0629  0.8020 
Executive staff adaptations and establishment problems 
i
   0.1569 0.1589  0.9750  0.3234 
Clashes with the staff (petitions, strikes,...) 
i
   -0.1195 0.1930  0.3833  0.5358 
Use of new organizational devices        
ISO 9001, ISO 9002, EAQF Certification 
j
   0.4089 0.1604  6.4964  0.0108 
Other certification or total quality management 
j
   0.1545 0.1389  1.2379  0.2659 
Value analysis, functional analysis, or "AMDEC" method 
j
   -0.0932 0.1582  0.3470  0.5558 
5S method or Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) method 
j
   0.4285 0.1631  6.8979  0.0086 
Organization in profit centers 
j
   0.1763 0.1351  1.7015  0.1921 
Formal in-house customer/ supplier contracts 
j   0.1045 0.1380  0.5728  0.4492 
System of "Just in time" delivery 
j
   -0.3277 0.1778  3.3980  0.0653 
System of "Just in time" production 
j
   0.1577 0.1781  0.7846  0.3757 
       Evolution in hierarchical layers between 1994 and 1997 
k
  
      
1 and more  -0.0279  0.2610  0.0114  0.9150 
-1 -0.0204  0.1629  0.0156  0.9005 
-2 and less  -0.3818  0.2959  1.6652  0.1969 
Team work        




      
10%  to less than 50%   0.0247  0.1780  0.0193  0.8895 
50%  and more  0.0651  0.2613  0.0620  0.8033   37
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  Reference is "less than 10%". 
m
  Response is either "yes" or "no".  
n
  Reference is " 1 ≤ ". See B. of appendix 2 for the construction of the variable.  




Pr  >  ChiSq 




     
10%  to less than 50%    0.4672 0.1863  6.2869  0.0122 
50%  and more   0.8599 0.3590  5.7362  0.0166 
      
 •   Share of production workers participating in project teams 
l
 :        
10%  to less than 50%   -0.0944  0.1838  0.2640  0.6074 
50%  and more -0.0239  0.4492  0.0028  0.9575 
        •  Share of others workers participating in self managed teams 
l
 : 
      
 10%  to less than 50%   -0.3616  0.1983  3.3244  0.0683 
 50%  and more -0.2979  0.3314  0.8082  0.3687 
      
•  Share of others workers participating in problem solving groups 
l
: 
      
10%  to less than 50%    0.1016 0.2065  0.2419  0.6229 
50%  and more   0.2644 0.3815  0.4801  0.4884 
      
 •  Share of others workers participating in project teams 
l
 :        
10%  to less than 50%    0.1084 0.1851  0.3428  0.5582 
50%  and more  0.0786 0.3393  0.0537  0.8168 
        •  Who is/was authorized in 1997 to participate in project teams? 
      
Management 
m
   
-0.3374 0.1701  3.9368  0.0472 
Production worker 
m
   




0.1610 0.1591  1.0239  0.3116 
        •  Average number of task each type of individual  
is responsible for 
n
 : 
      
1.1 to 1.4   0.0988 0.1917  0.2656  0.6063 
1.5 to 1.7  0.1538 0.2221  0.4796  0.4886 
1.8 and more   -0.1319 0.2414  0.2984  0.5849 